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Murray Fulton: we heard from Gordon McBean about the importance of policy and 
what can happen if there is uncertainty about it. Benjamin Gramig then talked about 
some of the important things to consider as we design policy specifically on economic 
factors—some of the costs and bureaucratic aspects likely to be entailed. Harold Coward 
gave us some things to think about in terms of ethical considerations that might go into 
a policy decision. I’d like to say comment on the meeting in December in Copenhagen 
that has been mentioned, at which an attempt will be made to come up with a new inter-
national framework for dealing with climate change. It’s particularly interesting to think 
about Copenhagen occurring when the world is going through a major financial crisis. 
Debates and discussions are going on around what should the economic order look like; 
people are questioning capitalism in the twenty-first century. There’s a very interesting 
article by Joseph Stiglitz, the nobel Prize winner, in the July 009 issue of Vanity Fair. 
Stiglitz says that there is a danger that this economic crisis will encourage protectionism. 
More importantly, he suggests that we need to look back at some of the policies that have 
governed the international monetary system over the past 30 or 40 years, and see how it 
was organized and in whose interest it was organized. He concludes that the developed 
world—and, in particularly, its large national institutions—have been the primary ben-
eficiaries of the international monetary system.
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I’ll use this as a jumping off point to talk about Copenhagen and subsequent meetings, 
and what we will see in terms of international climate-change policy. If we can take a 
lesson from the financial system, I think that greenhouse-gas policy will be drafted in a 
way that is going to benefit certain groups and it’s interesting to think about who those 
groups might be. I suspect that they will include large energy companies. I expect that 
some of the larger agricultural biotech firms will also be among the players. we also need 
to think in terms of countries; are we witnessing a period in which the influence of the 
west—particularly of the United States—is being lost to other countries, in particular 
India and China. will they put their stamps on this new policy environment in a way 
that fundamentally changes things? one of the speakers mentioned that developing 
countries want to “stick it to” the west for their policies over the last 0 or 30 years, and 
my guess is that, for the most part, they will have difficulty doing that. However, I also 
suspect that countries like India and China will play a role in a way that we haven’t seen 
before. The current economic crisis is one of the ways by which they will be able to get 
their foot in the door
Richard Gray: This issue of forming policy in the area of greenhouse gases will not only 
be a challenge in the short run, it will be a dramatic challenge in the long run. we are a 
long way from where we need to go. I’ll raise two issues. There’s a lot of interest in cap-
and-trade systems amongst the large emitters. This relates to Murray’s question; if, in fact, 
these large final emitters are allocated permits, they can actually profit and make higher 
returns on these systems. It’s not necessarily an imposition. If they have to purchase permits 
they are going to be worse off. If they are given their allocations they can actually benefit 
from these systems. what’s interesting with the cap-and-trade system is that consumers 
are generally left out of the picture. The refiners, for example, would have to have permits 
for the energy they consume in refining gasoline. But most of the energy is still left in the 
gasoline, and the consumers themselves are the ones who are going to have to make the 
decision to use less gasoline. I just came back from europe. The price of gasoline is double 
what it is here, which equates to a $00-per-ton carbon tax. It’s been that way for a long 
time and you can see some differences in the systems. They use energy more efficiently, 
they use public transportation more, and cars are more efficient. on the other hand, the 
differences in the systems are not enormous; conservation is also needed there. we have 
tremendous opposition to any kind of carbon tax. People believe in reducing greenhouse 
gases, but they resist paying some of the price of getting there.
Just a note on carbon sequestration: I think it is important to think about options 
where we don’t treat carbon sequestration in pools as necessarily permanent. The politi-
cal and economic realities are that contracts just don’t go out that far, and probably too 
much risk is implied in a contract that supposedly goes out that far. However, there is 
still value in storing something for a period of time and, rather than view it as purchase 
of permanent storage, rental of temporary storage is a better way to think about these 
carbon contracts. They shouldn’t be valued the same as permanent storage, but we need 
to develop mechanisms that don’t necessarily tie things up for a long period of time or 
would do so only through repeated contracts. 
9
Darrell Corkal: I’m with the Ministry of agriculture, in the agri-environment Services 
branch, but my fundamental organization is the Prairie farm rehabilitation administra-
tion. we have a physical sciences and social sciences project, and I want to emphasize 
what Harold Coward was saying: we need to look at the ethical and social consequences 
of climate change. what’s been fascinating about the study is how the physical and social 
sciences have been linked together. we know when John Palliser came here in 857–859 
for a survey of the prairie region, he said that it wasn’t fit for habitation; he concluded 
that, we now know from tree-ring data, because he came at the end of a prolonged period 
of drought, probably 0 to 5 years. Government policies, provincially and federally, 
established prairie settlements in the early 900s. Interestingly enough, some 500 years 
of tree-ring data suggest that such multi-year droughts in the prairies are recurring. of 
course, you have wetter-than-average years and drier-than-average years, but the multi-
year droughts are the problem. How did we as a society adapt to that? well we created 
organizations like the Hanna Special areas Board and the Prairie farm rehabilitation 
administration at the time when Canada was suffering its greatest economic and ecologi-
cal impact. The “dirty 30s” had a serious impact on the country. we were going through 
a world economic crash then as well, and the government of Canada was spending half 
of its budget on relief. we established a successful agriculture in the prairies by taking 
advantage of moisture retention in the clay soils. So, technical solutions were related to 
that. Institutional adaptation created organizations to help people understand and link 
the agronomy in water management to soil. Having said that, we are not completely free 
from vulnerability to drought. In their report on the effects of the 00–00 drought in 
Canada, elaine wheaton and Suren Kulshreshtha stated that a larger area of the country 
was affected than by the drought in 93. The impact to the country’s economy was a 
$6 billion drop in GDP, with a loss of 4,000 jobs. However, the ecological impact on 
resources wasn’t major because it lasted only  years. our management strategies allowed 
us to cope with a -year drought. If we were to get a 5- to 8-year drought or an 8- to 
0-year drought, as the tree-ring data suggest we might, the questions we are facing are: 
“will we be able to cope and how will we adapt?”
and this is where we come back to Harold’s comments. we must consider not only the 
technical aspects and the economic aspects, but also the social impacts. There’s a trend 
globally towards integrated water-resource management. even the term “stewardship” is 
being used in organizations’ names such as the Manitoba water Stewardship organiza-
tion. The notion of managing water and our resources by incorporating the stakeholders’ 
and citizens’ statements is increasingly gaining favor. How will governments, federally 
and provincially, manage that and actually allow stakeholders to have a say? There’s an 
increasing consensus about the need to move to a technocratic paradigm with a hazard-
centered interest in geophysical processes into one that emphasizes the mutuality of hazard 
and social conditions. Harold talked about what the consequences of our actions are. we 
also must consider the consequences of not acting.
Malcolm Devine (Performance Plants): Dr. Coward, I enjoyed your presentation. My ques-
tion concerns comments you made about your discussions with religious leaders from 
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different faiths, Judaism, Islam and Hinduism, and their views on transgenic plants and 
animals. I’m not sure whom you are speaking to in the Christian world. I assume it’s not 
the Pope. The vatican has a quasi-academy of sciences that recently met to discuss this 
whole topic. They gave their considered opinions, which you reflected to us; how do their 
opinions relate to those of the Catholic in the street, the Hindu in the field, the common 
man if you like? Is there a relationship? Because, whatever the lead Judaic scholars say that 
as long as the “cowism” of the cow is still there it’s okay, if I run into a Jewish colleague 
and ask him, he might say, “no way.” Can you comment on that?
Harold Coward: when we do the research in each tradition, we don’t go to religious lead-
ers like the Pope, in any of the traditions. we go to ethics theologians or scholars in the 
tradition, who have actually done work on the question, read the science, thought about 
it. In Islam they get the lawmakers together with Muslim scientists and try to come up 
with a position. and you are quite right: the leaders come up with positions that very 
often are miles apart from what the lay people say. I mentioned that we had focus groups 
as well, of lay people from each of these traditions. and we had separate focus groups of 
lay people who were scientists, lay people who were in animal-rights groups, lay people 
who were regulators, government regulators, and so on. we tried to get a cross-section 
of lay people, so it wasn’t just the ordinary chance person in the street, but included 
those actually engaged with the issues. take the Jewish example that you mentioned. The 
Halakhah Jewish law scholars in the universities were the ones who said, “no problem.” 
Put a pig gene in tomato or chicken, as long as it doesn’t change the appearance of the 
tomato or the chicken—and you can feed pig material even to a chicken and the digestive 
track of the chicken will purify it. as long as the chicken doesn’t change too much, that 
is in agreement with the talmudic position and there’s no difficulty. Laurie Zoloff, an 
orthodox Jewish scholar at Case western, has her research focused on the use of transgenic 
rice and how it could address hunger in asian countries. when we met with lay people, 
their response was—and it’s true for almost all traditions—abhorrence over any notion 
of transgenic animals, not so much over plants. It’s always the case that animals are closer 
to us as humans so that is where we tend to identify. So you get this separation, but that 
has been true in the history of the religious traditions all down the centuries. Leading 
scholars take positions and lay people take a while to catch up and go with them. and 
that’s true of our society in general, I would say, even for secular groups.
with reference to transgenic creations, whether animal or plant, secular vegetarians 
for example say that they are unnatural, whereas religious people say that you are playing 
God and shouldn’t be meddling and creating unnatural things. and you see the power 
of that language in marketing, in supermarkets everywhere. “natural” and “organic” are 
great sellers because they connect somewhere in the gut. It will take a while for our use 
of language to catch up with modern science and it will take a while within the religious 
traditions for the positions of the theologians to be understood and adopted by the lay 
people. I prefer to make my critical assessments on the basis of the scholars who have 
really thought through these issues, and the same with secular ethics positions.
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Tom Wilson (Pennsylvania State University): regarding an offset cap, do you think we need 
one? Should we just allow unlimited offsets to enter the market? future discount rate? So 
how do we account for future generations who plays a large role in emission-reduction 
targets? verification, validation and certification, what’s that process like?  Should we 
streamline it to allow more entries? Should we erect barriers to entry? and interaction 
between the new and old markets—where does the CCX come in?
Benjamin Gramig: Lots of material there. I’ll quickly address a couple of points and we 
can talk more after if you want to go into more detail. In terms of an offset cap, this is 
good. It’s is a common element of policy proposals, an upper limit on how much of those 
emissions that need to be met in some binding way by the firm subject to the cap—an 
upper limit on how many offsets they can use. for instance, under the current legislation 
being debated in the United States, there is an upper limit of  billion metric tons from 
offsets, roughly  billion domestic and  billion from international sources. So there 
tends to be a limit—.
Wilson: Per annum?
Gramig: Per annum, that’s right. Under legislation that was being debated last year, 5% 
of your emissions reduction obligation could be met using offsets. This is actually go-
ing to trickle down in the same way and it’s going to translate into a percentage of your 
emissions cap for an individual power facility that can be met using those. There’s a very 
complicated and hard-to-understand formula that actually spells out how this would 
happen in those ,00 pages that were mentioned. a lot of these details are left for the 
implementing agencies. I don’t know how this works in Canada with your government, 
but, when we pass legislation, oftentimes a lot of those details are left for the agencies to 
implement. The environmental Protection agency in this case, although that has changed 
as well in amendments to the original legislation. agriculture has been successful in mov-
ing control of the whole offset program over to the Department of agriculture and away 
from ePa. at least, as of tuesday, that was the case. I don’t know if things have changed 
since tuesday. They are changing at a rapid pace.
I will address just one of the other things that you mentioned and that was discount-
ing. How do you deal with some of these issues? The permanence issue is relevant here, 
in terms of how to think about how to assign these credits or allow firms to sell the offset 
credits they may generate from their practices. what the Chicago Climate exchange 
has done, and also what is being done in alberta, is you have to apply some sort of a 
discount factor to an individual practice. for instance, for every 5 metric tons I remove 
from the air through sequestration, I’m eligible to sell only 4. Something like that. and 
then access credits are commonly placed in something called a reserve pool, to cover 
1Chicago Climate exchange
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reversals. If people will revert on their practices to try and build up a reserve, it’s a safety 
margin for trying to keep in touch with the cap. If you had mass reversals ,this clearly 
would not work. It’s an imperfect solution, but it is one way they have tried to address 
that particular issue.
Wilson: You said the reserve pool is actually to account for a discount rate? or those that 
default?
Gramig: You can think about it as default. They revert. Maybe I sign an 8-year contract 
and I provide sequestration for those 8 years; what happens if, at the end of 8 years, I 
plow up my field because I want to get another 8-year contract the following year? These 
kinds of details haven’t been worked out, but the idea is they would then put in extra 
additional credits over the course of those 8 years that are there and are accounted for. 
everybody feeding credits into the system is doing that so you build up a pool to try and 
control the total amount, or account for some amount of reversal that occurs over the 
whole portfolio of farmers.
Wilson: Then I guess the only other burning question is, are the new markets interacting 
with the old?
Gramig: They are trying to take these things into account when they design the policy. 
So, for instance, if you look at specifically the issue of additionality and what practices 
are going to be credited, all the tillage, reduced tillage, no-tillage, out there that might be 
eligible under the US legislation has a retroactive date. It goes back to January , 00. 
That happens to coincide with the same rule that is in place for the CCX. It happens to 
coincide with the same rule that’s in place for the alberta offset system as well. So some 
harmonization is going on in trying to make some of these things link up, and through 
things like the western Climate Initiative. There’s clearly a close link in trying to develop 
at least the Canadian and US policies. Maybe at the provincial level right now and at a 
state level, but sometimes these things lead to larger initiatives and, hopefully, will provide 
some framework in the future. There is reference to Kyoto as well in trying to keep intact 
the clean development mechanism and those other linkages in the legislation, so that it 
leads to international efforts as well.
Audience Member: when you were discussing why economists like cap and trade, you 
compared, or you contrasted, Co and So, and suggested they were different because 
So delivers its problems from a point source. But something disturbs me about that 
because, for example, if you take the sea-level rise and the storm surge in particular 
coming from sea-level rise, it has much potential to impact coastal areas. Some 80% of 
the United States is coastal. two thirds of the world live within 00 miles of the coastal 
range. So the economic cost of storm-surge-related problems is certainly comparable or 
more to what happened to the appalachians.
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Gramig: one of the biggest criticisms of the So program was the disproportionate divi-
sion of costs and benefits. Perhaps most of the problems originate in the US Midwest 
where there are many old, coal-based power-generation plants, and the problems are 
being deposited on the northeast and the eastern part of Canada. In terms of imposing 
restrictions on those power plants, a lot of associated costs would be concentrated there, 
whereas all the benefits would be experienced by the receptors. This is clearly going to be 
the case where sea-level rise affects concentrated populations in various locations across 
the world. Concentrated costs or damages will be experienced. The emissions that occur 
everywhere have effects at some marginal level, right? The idea was that all these different 
locations contribute in an equivalent way to the overall impact on the climate. 
Steve Pueppke (Michigan State University): Harold, you mentioned that religious leaders’ 
willingness to accept GM animals and plants depended on the motivation—why they 
were made. on one level I understand that, but it seems to me that figuring out what 
the motivation is could be difficult. would you comment on how you figure out why 
those things happen.
Coward: You’re right. In my analysis, the most common thing that all of the religions 
came back to is motivation. and they all agree that the motivation has to be positive. for 
the good, not only of humans, but animals, plants, earth, air, water. each tradition has 
its different way of trying to assess that. Buddhism uses deep meditation to come to an 
individual realization of what their bottom-line motivation is, doing it under a teacher. 
In Judaism, it’s much more the law. In Christianity, it’s a question of how you understand 
the stewardship ethic as it’s laid out for you, and then are you behaving in such a way to 
be a steward following that ethic or are you doing it for your corporate bottom line or 
for your own selfish profit, and so on? So, every tradition cultures its own believers in 
an understanding of what selfishness would be in that tradition. now, I think we can, 
even in a secular way, come to some understanding of what selfishness would be. If I fol-
lowed the model that I laid out to begin with, I said if you are doing it only for yourself 
and your family it might be ethical, but you can’t distinguish between ethical and selfish 
there. But if you extend it to your neighbors and everybody else in your own region and 
country, that could count as ethical. If you extend not being selfish to people in other 
countries and so on to future generations to, at the ultimate level, earth, animal, plants 
and water. and that can be monitored in policy decision level. what does your policy say 
as to how you are going to decide in your behavior? I think there are ways to put teeth 
into the criteria there.
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